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ABSTRACT 
 The purpose of this research was to attempt to determine the key leading 
indicators of safety in the nuclear energy generation industry. A leading indicator is a 
metric of safety performance that is not dependent on trending injuries or incidents. 
This study was conducted by sending surveys to individuals working in the nuclear 
energy industry, and attempting to rate a set of indicators by their responses. This 
research was unsuccessful in empirical validation of any of the surveyed indicators, but 
does indicate that the concept is well known and accepted in the industry, and paves 
the way for a more in depth study in safety culture and systems in this highly specialized 
industry. Of the surveyed indicators, three seemed to have a more substantial impact 
than others according to feedback given. The three indicators are: maintenance of 
safety critical equipment, ease of use of technical manuals and guides, and relevance of 
employee training. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 As the demand for power from consumers grows higher and higher over the 
years, new forms of energy have been tapped to meet demand. One of those resources 
is nuclear energy generation. Nuclear energy has been powering America since 1973, 
and throughout the 40 years of operational service, it has proven to be a safe reliable 
method of generating power. One of the biggest issues holding back the continuing 
spread of nuclear energy is the publicity surrounding high impact low frequency 
disasters, like those at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and more recently the Fukushima 
incident in Japan.  
 The key distinguishing feature of leading indicators versus the more antiquated 
lagging lies in their relationship to the time of the incident. Leading indicators are 
viewed primarily as being preventative in nature, while lagging indicators happen after 
the incident (Reiman, 2012).While many different failures caused these incidents, the 
one to be explored in the following document is behavior based safety, and leading 
indicators of safety, and how they may be integrated into an industry in its renaissance 
(Fukushima, June 2012).  
 
BACKGROUND 
 
 Atomic energy production relies on very complicated systems that, depending 
on the reactor, use heat generated from the reactor to produce steam, which turns a 
turbine and thus produces electricity. These systems are dependent on a complicated 
plethora of system safety controls for maximum stability. Undoubtedly, Fukushima, 
Three Mile Island, and Chernobyl emerge as some of the most startling examples of 
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what can go wrong when strict adherence to a safety culture is faltered. However, these 
are but large examples of what can happen when small problems are misdiagnosed. 
  It is of no surprise that the nuclear industry is but one of many that are 
adopting leading indicators of safety in order to improve the reliability and fortitude of 
their safety climate. An indicator is defined as, “any measure- quantities or qualitative- 
that seeks to produce information on an issue of interest (Reiman, 2012).” However 
there is a distinctive need for knowing the difference between so called “leading” and 
“lagging” indicators. Reiman states that the difference between leading and lagging 
indicators can best be thought of by their relationship to the time of the incident. 
Leading indicators are viewed primarily as being preventative in nature, while lagging 
indicators happen after the incident (Reiman, 2012). Grabowski takes a view of leading 
indicators as the primary preventative countermeasure, and the best way to avoid 
future incidents (Grabowski, 2007).  
 Leading Indicators have long been accepted in the nuclear energy generation 
industry as useful, powerful, and privative tools. But the question remains, what are the 
key performance indicators of safety in this ever challenging industry?  
 Throughout the studies conducted on leading indicators, the clear focus seems 
to be that these measure need to be implemented on a much wider scale, and the 
nuclear industry is no exception as Martha Grabowski points out, “Some work has been 
done to identify predictive indicators for safety-critical systems such as nuclear power 
plants, but little work has been undertaken to empirically validate predictive leading 
indicators… (Grabowski, 2007).” The work referred to is a 2002 article entitled Safety 
Performance Measurement in Process Industries. The article is written by Lehtinenen 
and Walstrom and focuses on European, mostly Swiss and Finnish, organizations 
(Lehtinenen, 2002). During this study, the pair manages to identify 5 categories key 
indicators the individual plant (Lehtinenen, 2002). However, as Grabowski points out, 
these are not empirically validated. It is however shown that leading indicators of safety 
can be used a predictive tool in predicting incidents in the nuclear industry (Grabowski, 
2007) (Lehtinenen, 2002) (Reiman, 2012). The aim of this study is apply known leading 
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indicators from other industries that are analogous to the nuclear energy industry, and 
validate them into the Lehtinenen categories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
  To being with, literature on the subject of nuclear energy in regards to 
occupational safety habits is scarce. As a result of this unfortunate shortage, most of the 
literature used to form this study is taken from analogous industries and general 
occupational safety and health.  
 The first key document used to understand the need of formal study in leading 
indicators in the nuclear energy generation field is a work by Harold Roland and Brian 
Moriarty entitled System Safety Engineering and Management. While this work bears 
very little direct relevance to the study at hand, it does provide a formal and technical 
background on the subject of systems safety. Perhaps the most pertinent section of the 
work in regards to this study is the section regarding preliminary hazard analysis, as well 
as the section on risk management. 
 Dan Peterson’s book entitled: Measurement of Safety Performance proved 
absolutely vital to defining the concept of leading indicators, and perhaps even more 
important, describing their practical usage. Peterson identifies that measuring safety 
performance is “the industry’s’ most serious problem (Peterson, 2005). Peterson offers 
a book not about traditional methods of safety performance, but rather a discussion of 
their weaknesses and an offer of improvements. 
 Above all, Peterson establishes the need of forward looking measurements, 
focused on behaviors and prevention, as opposed to the traditional methods of tracking 
OSHA reportable incidences and injury rates (Peterson, 2005). Peterson establishes a 
clear difference between leading and lagging indicators by example. According to 
Peterson, some examples of leading metrics are those focus on: process hazard reviews, 
incident investigation, behavioral observation, safety audits, employee attitude surveys, 
training records, and measure of potential incidents (Peterson, 2005). 
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Another key work in any discussion of safety metrics is William Tarrants’ The 
Measurement of Safety Performance. Tarrants work is in depths look into the necessity 
and evolution of safety measurement, and offers several keen insights into the 
importance of effective indicators. Tarrants offers by far one of the best discussions on 
the establishment of a workable data collection methodology for the safety 
professional, establishing the clear need to a concise feedback and updates (Tarrants, 
1980). Tarrants also makes clear the relationship between the measure and the 
countermeasure, as well as the use of control groups. Tarrants work is a far reaching 
broad analysis of a plethora of safety systems concepts and fundamental skills and is a 
must read for any working safety professional. 
 The data collection methodology described by Tarrants is based on inferential 
statics and the scientific method (Tarrants, 1980). Tarrants lays out the five steps that 
are typically recognized by researchers in intelligent problem solving, which are 
analogous to the scientific method (Tarrants, 1980). The planning steps established by 
Tarrants provide a guide to laying down a foundation upon which a safety culture built 
on leading indicators can be built. Tarrrants expresses very clearly that the most 
important part of the procedure is the overall understanding of scientific problem 
solving (Tarrants, 1980). Using data analysis methodology, the safety program 
administrator has a chance to formulate productive and effective countermeasure 
through controlled experiments as opposed to simple trial and error tests based on 
accident or injury data, or pure speculation (Tarrants, 1980). Data collection is also 
expressed in terms of its usefulness to the operator (Tarrants, 1980). For example, a 
nuclear facility may collect a plethora of data regarding potential hazards, but if a data 
collection methodology or administrator cannot establish an organized manner of data 
collection, or a set of data, established with a control group, the methodology may be 
under-utilized, or not effective in the manner in which it was originally contrived to be 
(Tarrants, 1980) 
 Martha Gradowski, Premnath Ayyalasomayajula, Jason Merrick, John Harrald, 
Karlene Roberts combine their expertise to offer an excellent in depth analysis of 
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leading indicators in virtual organizations. Grabowski outlines the article with the 
mission statement of any safety program, which is “to develop intervention strategies to 
avoid future accidents (Martha Grabowski, 2007).” Grabowski continues to outline the 
importance of leading measures, “recognizing signals before an accident occurs offers 
the potential for improving safety, and many organizations have sought to develop 
programs that identify and benefit from alerts, signals, and prior indicators (Martha 
Grabowski, 2007).”  
 Grabowski’s article is focused primarily on virtual organizations, defined as 
those which are “temporarily linked together for a competitive advantage.” Such 
organizations do not translate directly to nuclear energy facilities, however, the 
groundwork Grabowski ET. Al. establish for leading measures is invaluable to any 
industry. 
 Perhaps the greatest take away from Grabowski’s article is the definitions of 
leading and lagging indicators, as well as the comparison of their effectiveness. 
Grabowski cites the definition of leading indicators as follows: 
“Leading indicators, one type of accident precursor, are conditions, events or 
measures that precede an undesirable event and that have some value in 
predicting the arrival of the event, whether it is an accident, incident, near miss, or 
undesirable safety state. Leading Indicators, sometimes referred to as 
performance indicators, metrics or indices, are associated with proactive activities 
that identify hazards and assess, eliminate, minimize and control risk (International 
Standards Organization, 1999; International Atomic Energy Agency, 2000; Lehtinen 
and Wahlstrom, 2002).” 
 To further reinforce the time and place for leading indicators, Trond Kongsvik, 
Petter Almklov, and Jorn Fenstad discuss the effectiveness of indicators in general on 
organizational wide issues and safety climate. In the article, Kongsvik argues that while 
leading indicators are undoubtedly effective in preventing accidents and establishing 
effective safety measure, alone they lack the scope to be effective in establishing a 
safety climate (Trond Kongsvik, 2010).  
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 Kongsvik argues that in addition to safety indicators to keep small unit level 
incidents low, risk analysis and safety climate are effective supplemental tools to ensure 
organization wide issues are captured (Trond Kongsvik, 2010). Kongsvik aims in the 
article to explore the relationship between the indicators of safety when they address 
organizational qualities and complex causal chains of events (Trond Kongsvik, 2010). 
This approach, the author argues, will prove much more effective when “the 
organizational error is root cause in a large scale accident where technical failure or 
simple human error cannot serve as explanation alone (Trond Kongsvik, 2010).” The 
type of organizational failure described by Kongsvik is eerily reminiscent of the 
Fukushima Daiichi catastrophe and the several organizational and systems level failures 
that led to such a failure. 
 The ANS committee delves into the incident with an in depth accident analysis, 
in an attempt to determine root cause. Through this analysis several key factors become 
apparent. The first discovery of importance was that all Japanese Nuclear Power Plants 
use seismic instrumentation systems, which are designed to immediately shut down the 
reactors in the event of an earthquake, and that during the earthquake, these systems 
functioned as designed (Fukushima, June 2012). The ANS also determined that the 
emergency power generation systems functioned as designed during the earthquake. 
However, the waves of the tsunami caused by the earthquake where much more 
detrimental to the facility (Fukushima, June 2012).  
 While the individual technical analysis of the reactors and their particular fail 
modes is undoubtedly useful in understanding the incident, for the purposes of this 
study, only a simplistic high level understanding is necessary. The ANS analysis revealed 
that while the earthquake was catastrophic, and one of the largest seen in recent 
Japanese history, all of the safety systems functioned as designed, and prevented 
catastrophic damage to the reactors from the earthquake (Fukushima, June 2012). 
However, the Tsunami provided circumstances that the safety systems of the facility 
were not designed to overcome.  
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 System safety is undoubtedly vital in the nuclear power generation industry, 
and as such leading indicators that directly tie into systems safety will prove vital tools in 
both accident prevention, and hardware failure. Teemu Reiman, and Elina Pietikainen 
explore such a concept in their safety science article. Reiman maintains the standing 
approximate definition of a leading indicator as and a monitor or drive based indicator, 
versus a reactive lagging indicator (Teemu Reiman, 2012). Reiman also maintains the 
agreement that simply implicating a hardware failure on a systems level incident or 
human error on an accident is not sufficient. Reiman outlines two types of leading 
indicators that are applicable to systems safety.  
 The first of them is the drive indicators. The drive indicators are “measures of 
the fulfillment of the selected safety management activities (Teemu Reiman, 2012).” 
Reiman uses these drive indicators to directly implement control measures which are 
designed to reduce or change the unsafe activities. Drive indicators are most effective 
while being used to determine if hazard control and safety development are performing 
as needed (Teemu Reiman, 2012). Reiman states the importance of the feedback loop 
as demonstrated below: 
 In addition to the drive indicators, there are also monitor indicators. Monitor 
indicators are defined as, “those which reflect the potential and capacity of the 
organization to perform safely (Teemu Reiman, 2012).” These indicators are a way to 
monitor not only the effectiveness of the drive indicators, and the controls that have 
been implemented as a result of them, but also seek to measure the internal dynamics 
of the safety system, and provide feedback as to the performance of that system 
(Teemu Reiman, 2012). Reiman also clearly outlines the need for these indicators to 
monitor factors that are outside of the organization’s control, for example new 
legislative and regulatory demands, that may affect the operations of the facility and the 
sociotechnical safety system. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
  
 The methodology of this study centers around a 2002 study conducted by 
Lehtinen and Walstrom which centered around identifying key leading indicators in 
Swiss and Finnish nuclear power facilities (E. Lehtinen, 2002). In this study, 5 categories 
are established that can be used as a framework to establish specific and realistic 
leading indicators of safety for practical use by nuclear energy facilities. Using the 
framework of the Lehtinen study, a survey was conducted using key indicators taken 
from other analogous industries, and participants were asked to rate their agreement 
each individual indicator. This survey consisted of 27 indicators taken from a wide 
variety of sources. 
  The primary source for the indicators surveyed was process safety 
management, as it demonstrates several analogous qualities to the nuclear industry, 
such as the specificity of tasks, and the precision required of engineering personnel in a 
low frequency high risk environment (Teemu Reiman, 2012). While these leading 
indicators will certainly not encompass the complex and ever evolving need of the 
nuclear energy field, the aim of this study is merely to pilot leading indicators in a 
severely under research field. The survey sent to participants includes a list of 18 
indicators and is anonymous. The survey was distributed using a “snowball” method 
consisting of sending the survey out to 30 initial contacts, and including the instructions 
to forward the survey to applicable participants that they may know. The 30 initial 
contact were obtained through research into various plants located across North 
America, and contacts were selected on the basis of available contact information, and 
employment in the nuclear energy generation field. 
  Ideally, participants would be selected on the basis of experience in the safety 
field as it pertains to nuclear energy as opposed to the nuclear industry in general, but 
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given the difficulty in obtain such contacts without prior familiarity with such individuals 
is difficult. The snowball method was chosen as a means to pilot a wide range of 
participants in the industry and attempt to gather data from a representative sample.  
The questions were selected by perusing the available literature and either using 
examples given in the literature or formulating indicators based on the common themes 
of the literature. Many of the indicators used were sampled from literature based on 
process safety and systems safety backgrounds. These areas where chosen due their 
analogous nature with the nuclear industry in both complexity, and specificity of task 
(Fukushima, June 2012) (Harold Roland, 1990) (Martha Grabowski, 2007) (E. Lehtinen, 
2002). 
 
RESEARCH 
 
 The purpose of this study is to assist professionals working in the nuclear 
energy generation industry in creating indicators with which to measure their facility’s 
safety performance. 
  The initial goal of the study was to identify and validate a group of 3-7 
indicators which could be clearly identified as the key leading indicators of safety for this 
industry. However, due to a small sample size, and minimal variance amongst the 
responses to the surveyed indicators, this goal was not achieved.  
 What was achieved however, was a pilot study that offers a rare glimpse into 
the safety culture of a severely under researched industry. It is highly recommended 
that this study be repeated under more expansive circumstances by a researcher or 
research team with more access to those involved in the industry. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 Survey participants where asked about 18 different leading measures taken 
primarily from the process safety industry, and applied to the Lehtinen categories. 
Participants were asked to rate their agreement using a 1-5 scale ranging from “strongly 
agree” to “strongly disagree.” Each question also included a provisional “additional 
comments” are where the participant could elaborate on a particular response if 
desired. The survey was distributed using a “snowball” method in which the initial 
invitations where sent out to 30 individuals with a request to forward the survey to 
whoever they feel may be qualified to participate. There was a preliminary question 
asked regard the potential participant’s involvement in the industry. If it was 
determined the subject did not work in the nuclear energy industry, they were not 
allowed to submit responses to the survey questions. 
The following leading indicators were chosen for this study: 
1.Management Commitment to safety. 
2.Management accountability.  
3.Employee engagement in safety. 
4. Relevance of employee training (I.E. the employee learned new skills, or reinforced 
established skills used in the employee's position). 
5. Frequency of employee training. 
6. Frequent review and update of safety programs. 
7. Effective Management of Change practices. 
8. Frequent update and review of employee training materials. 
9. Ease of use of technical manuals and guides. 
10. Effectiveness of system safety management systems ( FTA, FEMA, MORT). 
11. Follow up on safety action items. 
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12. Inspections of safety critical plant items and equipment. 
13. Auditing of safety systems. 
14. Fatigue Risk education. 
15. Maintenance rate of safety critical systems. 
16. Control Loop Performance.  
17.  Alarm Management. 
18. Deviations from standard operation. 
 
 The overall response rate to the survey was disappointingly low. Out of the 30 
initial surveys sent out, only 6 were returned complete. However responses from the 6 
were very concise and many offered insightful feedback on safety culture and leading 
indicators in the nuclear industry (Table 1). 
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Table 1 
Survey response data 
Indicator         Average 
Management commitment to safety       4.3 
Management accountability        4.3 
Employee engagement in safety       4 
Relevance of employee training       4.3 
Frequency of employee training       4.3 
Frequent review and update of safety programs     4.1 
Effective management of change practices      4 
Frequent update and review of employee training materials   4.3 
Ease of use of technical manuals and guides      3.8 
Effectiveness of system safety management systems     4.3 
Follow up on safety action items       4.6 
Inspections of safety critical plant items and equipment    4.5 
Auditing of safety systems        4.3 
Fatigue risk education        3.5 
Maintenance rate of safety critical systems      4.3 
Control loop performance        4 
Alarm management         4 
Deviations from standard operation       4.3 
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 There are several recurring themes that participants repeatedly mentioned. 
And as a whole, safety is a clear priority in all of the respondent’s minds. Safety governs 
the mindset of the operators in every action they take. There is a recurring mention of a 
“Safety Conscious work Environment” or “SCWE.” Safety Conscious Work Environment 
is an example of organizational wide safety system that is involved in training, 
monitoring, and operations level actions taken at the facility. This type of organizational 
safety system which promotes a culture of safety consciousness would be able to 
greatly bolster an advantage through the implementation of leading measures.   
 It is important to note that through the comments of the survey several key 
recurring themes where identified. The first that is made very clear is that the nuclear 
industry is undoubtedly very highly regulated in the United States. There are wide 
varieties of governing agencies mentioned in the comments ranging from the NRC 
(Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to INPO (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations). 
These agencies are responsible for regulating safety concerns in the industry, and as 
such have touched everything from training, to equipment specifications to be used in 
U.S. plants. The survey revealed that these agencies even require the sites to 
demonstrate that they are capable of reporting an incident in a timely manner every 
fiscal quarter. 
 The second key theme revolves around the need for constantly improving 
training. This is another aspect of the industry that is heavily touched by regulating 
bodies. INPO and the NRC both regulate continuing education and licensing program for 
reactor operators and other key operational personnel. There is also mention of a 
concept known as “Just in Time Training.” This process is described by the respondent as 
basing training evolutions on the current and most prevalent risk factors, and is used to 
ensure that the team can perform the task in the event of an emergency.  Training 
materials are reviewed both prior to and post training to ensure that the training is 
applicable, strong, and is as up to date as it can be. It would seem that overall the 
nuclear industry is much attuned to the “Kaizen” mentality and is always seeking 
improvement. The respondents also mentioned a fear of complacency, further 
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reinforcing the idea of continuous improvement, with one respondent saying, “it is easy 
to become complacent if the system works well, but then you are missing out on 
continuous improvements.” 
 The third major recurring theme is the familiarity with safety systems, and 
safety culture. Respondents mentioned a Safety Conscious Work Environment or SCWE 
several times in the survey. This would be an example of a safety system, which engages 
the employees and their systems into one harmonious culture designed around safe 
practices. SCWE encompasses training, maintenance of equipment, monitoring of safety 
critical systems, and management accountability. One response stated that SCWE was 
so ingrained into the culture of the facility, that it encompassed every action taken in 
the facility.  
 The responses are quite uniform to almost every indicator surveyed. This is 
likely due to the extremely small sample size, and the small likelihood of safety 
professionals being the ones actually taking the survey. Due to the nature of the 
respondents and the responses, nothing of statistical significance can be drawn from 
this research. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
 
 The response rate to the previously mentioned survey was surprisingly small, 
although a number of factors may explain this. The first is that the nuclear industry is 
one that is under constant scrutiny from the public eye, and as a result many of the 
professionals surveyed may not have felt comfortable revealing such in depth 
information of the safety culture of their industry or facility. Another possible 
explanation for the low response rate is the level of secrecy, and perhaps questions, 
regarding the employee’s ability to respond to the survey in accordance with plant or 
company level non-disclosure agreements. Secrecy in the nuclear power generation 
industry is undoubtedly related to the security measures need to insure the safety of 
personnel working at these facilities from items such as terrorist attacks, cyber security 
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threats, and an ever changing list of external hazards. The survey returned a small 
sample size of 6 individual completed surveys. This is not adequate enough of a sample 
size to fully empirically validate any indicator with the nuclear industry, and is not a 
representative sample of the industry.  
 Furthermore, the survey questions ask about the participant’s background in 
the nuclear industry, but make no mention of experience in a safety management type 
of role. This was done in order to allow a larger sample size, and to maintain a 
representative sample of operators, managers, and other individuals who, in addition to 
the safety program manager, would have direct responsibility in organization level 
safety issues.  
 Another limitation is the geographical density of the survey respondents. All of 
the survey responses indicated they were located in the state of South Carolina. While 
this may seem insignificant, as the ANS points out, geographic placement of nuclear 
power plants has a huge effect on hazard analysis (Fukushima, June 2012). Perhaps a 
plant located in a more seismically active area, or one located in an area with very little 
water to support cooling would have rated risk analysis based questions much higher. 
This would also strongly indicate that all of the respondents are employed at a single 
plant, further narrowing a study meant to be representative of a large population. In 
addition to not being representative simply due to population, but also that this sample 
size may also not be representative due to the safety culture of a single area or plant. 
For example, nuclear facilities are under much more regulation and scrutiny in the 
United States as opposed to Japan (Fukushima, June 2012). This is primarily been 
attributed to the memory of the Three Mile Island incident still affecting the public, and 
therefore regulatory, view of the industry (Fukushima, June 2012).  
 The final primary weakness of this study is that the indicators are taken from 
an analysis of analogous industries and not from field research within a nuclear facility. 
While these indicators are mostly general, and could be applied to any task specific 
organization, they certainly may not represent the day to day safety struggles of a 
nuclear energy facility.  
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 However, I do believe that the responses submitted, while low in number, 
provide a rare glimpse into the safety culture of the nuclear power industry. It is 
important to note however, that the respondents were not asked if they are safety 
professionals, and as a result, it is safe to assume that the majority of them are not. 
Perhaps another limitation to the study is the fact that many of the respondents may 
have been confused as to what exactly a leading indicator was, seeing as many where 
likely not safety professionals. Regardless, the insight of the operators and technicians is 
equally important in regards to gauging both the effectiveness of an indicator, as well as 
the overall safety climate of an institution. Nearly every candidate agrees strongly with 
the listed indicators, and even more importantly provided feedback in the form of open 
comments related to the individual indicators. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
  
As the literature indicates, there is a strong current pushing the direction of 
safety management away from previously accepted lagging indicators (Tarrants, 1980). 
Leading indicators are not only more effective at accident prevention, but they also 
demonstrate system wide, and organizational issues if utilized in the proper way (Teemu 
Reiman, 2012). Leading indicators are also a better source of usable and actionable 
data, primarily due to the fact that an update of the data set can be performed at any 
time, without requiring someone to be injured (Trond Kongsvik, 2010).  
The literature also indicates the need for a diverse array of leading indicators 
designed to measure all of the necessary aspects of a sociotechnical safety system 
(Teemu Reiman, 2012). The indicators surveyed where collected primarily from Process 
Safety related articles due to the somewhat analogous nature of the two industries in 
specificity of task, and the high impact low frequency failure, and also due to the lack of 
research into the nuclear industry on the matter of accident prevention measures. It is 
important to note that all in all, as the ANS points out, the North American nuclear 
industry is a very safe one, with several decades passing from the last major incident, 
and low rates of workplace injury or illness (Fukushima, June 2012). However this does 
not diminish the need to establishing an effective set of leading indicators which can be 
used by safety professionals to establish countermeasure to potential failures. 
In recent years, the safety management profession has evolved substantially. 
New measure and countermeasures, as well as a greater focus on proactive prevention 
and improved data collection techniques, have created great strides in workplace safety 
(Peterson, 2005). Leading indicators have arisen as one of the most useful and 
consistently proactive tools the safety professional can have in their repertoire (Martha 
Grabowski, 2007).  
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Leading indicators are defined as those which: “…are associated with proactive 
activities that identify hazards and assess, eliminate, minimize and control risk 
(International Standards Organization, 1999; International Atomic Energy Agency, 2000; 
Lehtinen and Wahlstrom, 2002).”Found this in the Grabowski article, do I cite the whole 
deal or just Grabowski? Lagging indicators by contrast, rely on tracking previous attained 
data, such as accidents, or near misses, and then adjusting systems or behaviors as 
needed (Martha Grabowski, 2007).  
The primary strength of leading indicators in general, is that they are a stronger 
representative of the organization’s safety culture and performance (Martha Grabowski, 
2007). Leading indicators, by definition focus on the behaviors and key organizational 
factors that directly impact the likely hood of an accident or incident (Teemu Reiman, 
2012). The nature of leading indicators means that the safety system manager can 
obtain information that is both accurate and up to date, and does not require accidents 
or incidents to happen before measurement can be taken (Peterson, 2005). The use of 
leading indicators also enables a more effective feedback loop (Figure 1) to be formed, 
which will aid the safety program administrator in keeping the system dynamic. 
 
Figure 1 Feedback loop of Drive Indicators  
Source: Teemu Reiman, E. P. (2012). Leading Indicators of System Safety-Monitoring and Driving the 
Organizational Safety Potential. Safety Science, 1993-2000. 
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Lagging indicators by their nature can be very deceptive. For example, and 
organization that has not seen an accident in an extended period of time, may or may 
not be any more effective in preventing accidents than other organizations (Martha 
Grabowski, 2007). This is because it is entirely possible for an accident not to happen, 
simply because it does not happen. Essentially, chance is a factor in workplace 
accidents, one organization may just get lucky, and as a result relax or under-observe 
certain safety counter measures, resulting in a detriment to the overall safety culture of 
the organization (Trond Kongsvik, 2010) (Teemu Reiman, 2012) (Martha Grabowski, 
2007). Peterson uses the example of a supervisor, who has ten employees and retains 
and zero incident rate for a year with no action, just a bit of luck; this is simply 
unacceptable in industries where one failure can have catastrophic consequences 
(Peterson, 2005). Peterson continues on to describe in detail the failing of lagging 
indicators: they don’t assess whether systems are better or worse than others, they are 
not diagnostic, they do not offer any insight as to corrective action, and that they have 
very little statistical validity in smaller groups (Peterson, 2005) 
Lagging indicators are also much more limited in scope that leading indicators 
(Teemu Reiman, 2012). Monitoring injury rates may show partial effectiveness in 
prevented strains, sprains , and foreign objects to the eye, but they lack effectiveness in 
gauging the overall effectiveness of the safety program, and the organizational safety 
culture (Harold Roland, 1990) (Martha Grabowski, 2007) (Teemu Reiman, 2012) (Trond 
Kongsvik, 2010) (E. Lehtinen, 2002). As outcome indicators, they also much go must 
longer without being updated, due to the fact that an incident must first happen before 
data can be recorded (Teemu Reiman, 2012) (E. Lehtinen, 2002). Some argue that 
lagging indicators are to be used in conjunction with leading indicators to better 
construct s safety system that monitors all areas of effective data (Teemu Reiman, 
2012). While this may be true, it does not discount the superiority of the information 
granted from leading indicators, and the proactive nature of safety systems based on 
leading indicators (Teemu Reiman, 2012) (Trond Kongsvik, 2010) (Tarrants, 1980). 
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The nuclear industry faces a few unique challenges due to the nature and high 
visibility of failures (Fukushima, June 2012) (E. Lehtinen, 2002). While leading indicators 
may be not the key to preventing a reactor from meltdown, they do aim to identify and 
create countermeasures to ground level or organizational safety issues, which may 
prevent the human or equipment failure leading to a larger incident (Fukushima, June 
2012) (Harold Roland, 1990) (Martha Grabowski, 2007) (Trond Kongsvik, 2010) (E. 
Lehtinen, 2002). The nuclear industry in the United States is amongst the safest in the 
world, due to responsible regulations and a culture that promotes effective internal 
communication and constantly updated training (Fukushima, June 2012) (E. Lehtinen, 
2002). As previously stated, a good safety record is no excuse for complacency, as the 
recent Fukushima Daiichi incident shows (Fukushima, June 2012). This is why the 
identification and usage of leading indicators in the nuclear industry is vital (E. Lehtinen, 
2002). 
Wahlstrom and Lehtinen argue that what is not measured cannot be managed, 
and that in order to be effective, management goals must be tied to operations in a 
synchronous manner (E. Lehtinen, 2002). Lehtinen and Walhstrom demonstrate that the 
industry has already adopted a desire for such measures in areas such as finance, and 
argue that the incorporation of leading measures into the everyday safety management 
program will prove highly effective. The argument is also made that the lower the 
organizational level, the higher the need for motivational means other than financial 
gain (E. Lehtinen, 2002). 
Lehtinen offers a firm warning regarding the use of both qualitative and 
quantitative indicators in order to achieve safety goals. Many leading measure are by 
nature, qualitative, and can be difficult to measure as a result (E. Lehtinen, 2002) 
(Harold Roland, 1990) (Teemu Reiman, 2012). This means that the indicator and its data 
collection mechanism must be very carefully scrutinized and monitored to see if it must 
be revised (Trond Kongsvik, 2010) (Martha Grabowski, 2007) (E. Lehtinen, 2002). 
Lagging indicators, inversely, tend to be mostly quantitative in nature, and therefore 
may be easier to measure at first glance (E. Lehtinen, 2002). The issue with the duality 
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of the two indicators is that many times, a safety system will end up measuring the 
wrong areas, simply because they are easier to measure (E. Lehtinen, 2002). 
In addition to having the right indicators, one must also have the right means to 
measure them with. This is where a practical workable data collection methodology 
becomes absolutely vital (Tarrants, 1980) (E. Lehtinen, 2002) (Martha Grabowski, 2007). 
The data collection methodology described by Tarrants is based on inferential statics 
and the scientific method (Tarrants, 1980).  
There are five steps that are typically recognized by researchers in intelligent 
problem solving, which are analogous to the scientific method (Tarrants, 1980). The 
planning steps provide a guide to laying down a foundation upon which a safety culture 
built on leading indicators can be built (Tarrants, 1980). Tarrrants expresses very clearly 
that the most important part of the procedure is the overall understanding of scientific 
problem solving (Tarrants, 1980). Using data analysis methodology, the safety program 
administrator has a chance to formulate productive and effective countermeasure 
through controlled experiments as opposed to simple trial and error tests based on 
accident or injury data, or pure speculation (Tarrants, 1980). Data collection is also 
expressed in terms of its usefulness to the operator (Tarrants, 1980) (E. Lehtinen, 2002) 
(Martha Grabowski, 2007). For example, a nuclear facility may collect a plethora of data 
regarding potential hazards, but if a data collection methodology or administrator 
cannot establish an organized manner of data collection, or a set of data, established 
with a control group, the methodology may be under-utilized, or not effective in the 
manner in which it was originally contrived to be (Tarrants, 1980) (E. Lehtinen, 2002) 
(Teemu Reiman, 2012). 
Nuclear facilities are operated, generally speaking, in a very organized and 
methodical manner, due to the highly technical and sensitive nature of the processes 
involved (Fukushima, June 2012) (E. Lehtinen, 2002). This complicates the process of 
identifying and validating any kind of low level measures, due primarily to the fact that 
each and every plant is different, and that certain factors affect the general concerns of 
one facility over another. Regardless, the general safety science community is rapidly 
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embracing leading measures, and the nuclear industry has no reason to fall behind. 
Recent history has shown that complacency can lead to failure, and that remaining 
vigilant is a must for the industry (Fukushima, June 2012). 
Risk management is something that must indubitably be intertwined with any 
kind of effective safety management system (E. Lehtinen, 2002) (Peterson, 2005) 
(Teemu Reiman, 2012). Risk management by definition extends a company protection 
from all possible risks (E. Lehtinen, 2002). This includes damage to the environment and 
the community, as well as damages to the overall directive of the business (E. Lehtinen, 
2002). Risk management is absolutely vital to preventing incidents in the nuclear 
industry (Fukushima, June 2012) (E. Lehtinen, 2002), and something can be monitored 
using leading measures (Martha Grabowski, 2007) (Teemu Reiman, 2012).  
Risk management covers a vast majority of the external factors that could 
potentially lead to accidents and incidents, such as location of the facility itself (E. 
Lehtinen, 2002) (Fukushima, June 2012). It was determined that the primary issue that 
caused the failure of the spent fuel pools was an under designed flood line, and no 
protection from flooding was provided to the batteries that powered the cooling 
systems of the reactors (Fukushima, June 2012). 
Another key concept necessary to consider when contemplating indicators for 
nuclear power facilities is the concept of defense in depth (E. Lehtinen, 2002) 
(Fukushima, June 2012). Defense in depth is a systems safety measure that consists of 
three primary principal actions. The first of which is keeping the reactors fuel cool, the 
second is confining the radioactive material, and the third is managing reactor power (E. 
Lehtinen, 2002). While highly regarded as an effective countermeasure in the nuclear 
industry, it is still predominantly a reactive measure. 
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In which country do you reside? 
 Afghanistan (1) 
 Albania (2) 
 Algeria (3) 
 Andorra (4) 
 Angola (5) 
 Antigua and Barbuda (6) 
 Argentina (7) 
 Armenia (8) 
 Australia (9) 
 Austria (10) 
 Azerbaijan (11) 
 Bahamas (12) 
 Bahrain (13) 
 Bangladesh (14) 
 Barbados (15) 
 Belarus (16) 
 Belgium (17) 
 Belize (18) 
 Benin (19) 
 Bhutan (20) 
 Bolivia (21) 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina (22) 
 Botswana (23) 
 Brazil (24) 
 Brunei Darussalam (25) 
 Bulgaria (26) 
 Burkina Faso (27) 
 Burundi (28) 
 Cambodia (29) 
 Cameroon (30) 
 Canada (31) 
 Cape Verde (32) 
 Central African Republic (33) 
 Chad (34) 
 Chile (35) 
 China (36) 
 Colombia (37) 
 Comoros (38) 
 Congo, Republic of the... (39) 
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 Costa Rica (40) 
 Côte d'Ivoire (41) 
 Croatia (42) 
 Cuba (43) 
 Cyprus (44) 
 Czech Republic (45) 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea (46) 
 Democratic Republic of the Congo (47) 
 Denmark (48) 
 Djibouti (49) 
 Dominica (50) 
 Dominican Republic (51) 
 Ecuador (52) 
 Egypt (53) 
 El Salvador (54) 
 Equatorial Guinea (55) 
 Eritrea (56) 
 Estonia (57) 
 Ethiopia (58) 
 Fiji (59) 
 Finland (60) 
 France (61) 
 Gabon (62) 
 Gambia (63) 
 Georgia (64) 
 Germany (65) 
 Ghana (66) 
 Greece (67) 
 Grenada (68) 
 Guatemala (69) 
 Guinea (70) 
 Guinea-Bissau (71) 
 Guyana (72) 
 Haiti (73) 
 Honduras (74) 
 Hong Kong (S.A.R.) (75) 
 Hungary (76) 
 Iceland (77) 
 India (78) 
 Indonesia (79) 
 Iran, Islamic Republic of... (80) 
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 Iraq (81) 
 Ireland (82) 
 Israel (83) 
 Italy (84) 
 Jamaica (85) 
 Japan (86) 
 Jordan (87) 
 Kazakhstan (88) 
 Kenya (89) 
 Kiribati (90) 
 Kuwait (91) 
 Kyrgyzstan (92) 
 Lao People's Democratic Republic (93) 
 Latvia (94) 
 Lebanon (95) 
 Lesotho (96) 
 Liberia (97) 
 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (98) 
 Liechtenstein (99) 
 Lithuania (100) 
 Luxembourg (101) 
 Madagascar (102) 
 Malawi (103) 
 Malaysia (104) 
 Maldives (105) 
 Mali (106) 
 Malta (107) 
 Marshall Islands (108) 
 Mauritania (109) 
 Mauritius (110) 
 Mexico (111) 
 Micronesia, Federated States of... (112) 
 Monaco (113) 
 Mongolia (114) 
 Montenegro (115) 
 Morocco (116) 
 Mozambique (117) 
 Myanmar (118) 
 Namibia (119) 
 Nauru (120) 
 Nepal (121) 
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 Netherlands (122) 
 New Zealand (123) 
 Nicaragua (124) 
 Niger (125) 
 Nigeria (126) 
 Norway (127) 
 Oman (128) 
 Pakistan (129) 
 Palau (130) 
 Panama (131) 
 Papua New Guinea (132) 
 Paraguay (133) 
 Peru (134) 
 Philippines (135) 
 Poland (136) 
 Portugal (137) 
 Qatar (138) 
 Republic of Korea (139) 
 Republic of Moldova (140) 
 Romania (141) 
 Russian Federation (142) 
 Rwanda (143) 
 Saint Kitts and Nevis (144) 
 Saint Lucia (145) 
 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (146) 
 Samoa (147) 
 San Marino (148) 
 Sao Tome and Principe (149) 
 Saudi Arabia (150) 
 Senegal (151) 
 Serbia (152) 
 Seychelles (153) 
 Sierra Leone (154) 
 Singapore (155) 
 Slovakia (156) 
 Slovenia (157) 
 Solomon Islands (158) 
 Somalia (159) 
 South Africa (160) 
 Spain (161) 
 Sri Lanka (162) 
30 
 
 Sudan (163) 
 Suriname (164) 
 Swaziland (165) 
 Sweden (166) 
 Switzerland (167) 
 Syrian Arab Republic (168) 
 Tajikistan (169) 
 Thailand (170) 
 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (171) 
 Timor-Leste (172) 
 Togo (173) 
 Tonga (174) 
 Trinidad and Tobago (175) 
 Tunisia (176) 
 Turkey (177) 
 Turkmenistan (178) 
 Tuvalu (179) 
 Uganda (180) 
 Ukraine (181) 
 United Arab Emirates (182) 
 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (183) 
 United Republic of Tanzania (184) 
 United States of America (185) 
 Uruguay (186) 
 Uzbekistan (187) 
 Vanuatu (188) 
 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of... (189) 
 Viet Nam (190) 
 Yemen (191) 
 Zambia (192) 
 Zimbabwe (193) 
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In what state do you currently reside? 
 Alabama (1) 
 Arizona (2) 
 Arkansas (3) 
 California (4) 
 Colorado (5) 
 Connecticut (6) 
 Delaware (7) 
 District of Columbia (8) 
 Florida (9) 
 Georgia (10) 
 Idaho (11) 
 Illinois (12) 
 Indiana (13) 
 Iowa (14) 
 Kansas (15) 
 Kentucky (16) 
 Louisiana (17) 
 Maine (18) 
 Maryland (19) 
 Massachusetts (20) 
 Michigan (21) 
 Minnesota (22) 
 Mississippi (23) 
 Missouri (24) 
 Montana (25) 
 Nebraska (26) 
 Nevada (27) 
 New Hampshire (28) 
 New Jersey (29) 
 New Mexico (30) 
 New York (31) 
 North Carolina (32) 
 North Dakota (33) 
 Ohio (34) 
 Oklahoma (35) 
 Oregon (36) 
 Pennsylvania (37) 
 Rhode Island (38) 
 South Carolina (39) 
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 South Dakota (40) 
 Tennessee (41) 
 Texas (42) 
 Utah (43) 
 Vermont (44) 
 Virginia (45) 
 Washington (46) 
 West Virginia (47) 
 Wisconsin (48) 
 Wyoming (49) 
 Puerto Rico (50) 
 Alaska (51) 
 Hawaii (52) 
 I do not reside in the United States (53) 
 
Do you currently, or have you previously worked in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement: Management Commitment to safety 
is a key leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Additional Comments: 
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Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Management accountability is a key 
leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Employee engagement in safety is a 
key leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
 Additional Comments: 
 
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Relevance of employee training (I.E. 
the employee learned new skills, or reinforced established skills used in the employee's 
position) is a key leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
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Additional Comments: 
 
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Frequency of employee training is a 
key leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Frequent review and update of  safety 
programs is a key leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Additional Comments: 
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Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Effective Management of Change 
practices are a key leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Frequent update and review of 
employee training materials is a key leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Ease of use of technical manuals and 
guides is a key leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Additional Comments: 
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Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Effectiveness of system safety 
management systems ( FTA, FEMA, MORT) is a key leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy 
Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
Please rate your agreement with the following Statement:Follow up on safety action items is a 
key leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
 Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Inspections of safety critical plant 
items and equipment is a key leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
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Additional Comments: 
 
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Auditing of safety systems is a key 
leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Fatigue Risk education is a key leading 
indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Additional Comments: 
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Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Maintenance rate of safety critical 
systems is a key leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Control Loop Performance is a key 
leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Alarm Management is a key leading 
indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Additional Comments: 
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Please rate your agreement with the following statement:Deviations from standard operation is 
a key leading indicator in the Nuclear Energy Generation Industry. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Additional Comments: 
